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We Have Met the Enemy
Editors with plenty of election year thoughts do not readily
give up space, particularly editors with monthly columns.
But I ran across a piece of writing this summer that seems
highly worth sharing. It comes from the July newsletter for
Saint Paul's Episcopal Church in Dowagiac, Michigan. The
route by which this newsletter gets to me needs no
explanation here, but its arrival is always welcome, not least
because the editor has an eye for the truly good churchtype joke (it is surprising how rare these are). More than
this, however, and more than the evidence it provides that
church is church, parish is parish and the grass probably
isn't greener over there, even if their church doors are a
brighter red, I welcome the St. Paul's newsletter because of
the notes from the rector's desk. Father Robert Smith is
literate, modest, witty-and right on the money. Without
fuss, he often describes for me just exactly where
spirituality and daily life fit together.
This column, however, struck me so particularly that I
thought more folks ought to read it than the Episcopalian
faithful of Dowagiac. (Ifyou want to substitute "Lutheran"
in the last paragraph, I will understand.) Here, then, as
guest columnist, with his surprised permission, is Father
Smith:
Dear friends in Christ,
A book that has recently occupied some of my
reading time, The Case for Christian Humanism, by R. William
Franklin and Joseph M. Shaw, has this line for openers:
"Christian humanism is, in my mind, nothing other than
the traditional message of Christianity... " This has set me
to musing upon one of the neatest tricks the Evil One has
perpetrated on us in recent memory. Beginning in the
' 70s, if not earlier, a rising tide of criticism in both church
and state targeted the looming spectre of "Secular
Humanism!" as the chief threat to Christianity and one, in
part, lying deeply and treacherously hidden in her bosom.
In one form or another, this "straw person " is still
serving to distract our attention and energy from the real
enemy in our midst We hear alarums of "the spirit of the
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age" and, most""cutting of all, t~ : it~cusation of
"trendiness." (If one of the Je&i~tb :~eanings of this
vague term is "to be part of o/·.sl\4r.e"i~ the characteristics
of the most recent trend" and if one of the most recent
trends in the USA is the shrinking of the political and
ecclesiastical centers, then the existence of such groups as
the Prayer Book Society and the Episcopal Synod of
America is just as "trendy" as that of any of those at the
opposite end of the spectrum.)
Now, I want you to ask yourself this question. How
many ethical humanists have you seen lately lurking in the
shadows of liberalism intent on waylaying you into their
seductive lairs? As far as I can tell, they are an aging and
diminishing handful of archaic Victorians completely
without influence in this country. And while we have been
preoccupied with this non-issue, the real enemy has dug its
claws more and more firmly into our innards. What a
spectacular triumph for the Lord of Despair!
The real presence that ought truly to alarm us is that
of the spirit of competitive greediness, of success as
desirable and failure as culpable, of careerism, of winning,
of personal glamor and control, of the arrogance too often
seen in renewal circles, and of the the mindlessness too
often equated with evangelism.
In short, while we have been chasing the will-o'-thewisp of a threat from secular humanism, secular
materialism has worked its way into our hearts and has
been enthroned in our very center. It is alive, strong,
flourishing and a most crafty and durable adversary. And
the extent of its success is such that is has been accepted as
the authentic version of Christianity by some of the
currently most dominant religious groups in the country.
It is a worthy battle we are called upon to join, a real
struggle for the soul of a people, an encounter that would
excite the envy of Screwtape himselfl For the Episcopal
Church at its finest is the absolute repudiation of all that
secular materialism stands for and holds dear. Our finest
hour may lie just ahead!
Yours faithfully in jesus,
Robert A. Smith
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About this issue
The books read by last spring's Cresset Colloquium
occasioned a good deal of strong feeling. All the
participants agreed that the issues of discussion really
mattered-not J·ust m.at~er.eQ "academically" as we
sometimes say, bqot.n)a(L"a.aa.·f~J .~u~> .lives. The results of
our discussions ~gitl with Mark Sch~~h~ 's essay on page 5,
and continu~·lh}his issue with john R.aff s two poems. One
of the ques~qn; both Minnich ana:N~ss~ struggle with
is why the;t:- tihould be ~o~·.~itt;g"ory ~"Li"ed "academic"
which is se~ ·swarat~ fTD.;p·.~ilr ·l~\ie;;•.If tfil:f6: is something
academics:~<tul~ ·~~=~i·a· to. Ko\>~:HE "is th..it. their learning
and their l;Wi•
fl): rs>i~ik~r; •yet, ofte.ft:lhis joint proves
awkward, a'tfil'uitabte· .. • As we have : dohe before, we
commend th~1~·~oks to our readers:"•b,eiieving that they
offer not simpfy.),t.ieo'5t:sults of good thinking, but also the
fruits of the spirit. •• • • : •
Our columnist; hav~'. been thinking politically; it
seems not to matter whether The Nation, Film, Campus
Diary or Popular Culture-politics wins as subject. Cover
art continues the emphasis, and only the little jeu d'esprit by
Barbara Bazyn provides respite. Next month, even From
the Chapel will keep our eyes on the political scene, but
then, by mid-October it will be hard to think about
anything else. Election years, fortunately for journals that
intend to cover arts and literature, as well as public affairs,
come only now and then.
Enjoy the sun as it begins to slant around to the far
side of the window, and relish the crunch of a new apple.
If you're going back to school, sharpen your pencils and
vow once again to stay on the lines-most of the time.

. .. . ... .
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. .... . .

.....
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Downstream
I was seven.
Science was far away,
wrapped inside colored paper,
waiting for my 1Oth birthday.
I was throwing stones into a slow stream
hypnotized by spreading circles
oflight buoyed by ripples.
Then I watched skittery schools
of shiny fish, feeding over the sandy
bottom.
Suddenly pale petals
appeared on the surface,
floating downstream, perfect,
round, silent.
I gazed upstream to see

Peace,
GME

an angel bathing
beneath a cherry tree.
Each time she knelt
and stood, shaking free
of water, the lift
of her wings sent
shudders through the tree,
releasing a shower of blossoms
like feathered flesh.

Alexander M. Jacobs
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MINDING OUR MANNERS:
NOTES ON LIFE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ACADEMY
Mark Schwehn
According to recent custom, the Editor has chosen
several colleagues each spring to participate in a Cresset
Colloquium, to meet together and discuss a text, with the
promise that each will provide a written response of some
sort for the magazine during the following year, prompted
by the ideas in the book. This year, we read two texts:
Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich's Transforming Knowledge
(Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1990) and Martha
Nussbaum's Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and
Literature (Oxford University Press: New York, 1990). One
would expect that, given the stimulus of these two works,
the thinking of colleagues in French, American literature,
legal studies, music and American cultural history would
vary. Their responses here will demonstrate that variation
fruitfully. Both Professor Schwehn 's essay and Professor
John Ruffs poems explore their understanding of the
significant themes of the books: what is it that we know,
and how do we communicate that to others? In the first
essay, page references will appear in parentheses in the
text. Next month's issue will include further reflections by
other members of the Colloquium.
The Editor

Mark Schwehn, Dean of Christ (Honors) College at VU, upholds
in that locale the dignity of the social sciences in happy relationship
to the humanities. A student of American history, he has written
on a number of issues, most recently in connection with religious
higher education. He is Project Director of the Lilly Fellows
Program in the Humanities and the Arls, an initiative to foster a
commitment to Christian higher education in younger teacherscholars. His book, Exiles from Eden, will be published this fall
by Oxford University Press.
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We admit, then, that it matters that Aristotle's modes
of thinking allowed him to support his culture's
justifications of slavery and the subordination of women.
Having done so, we can also then notice and take very
seriously the fact that Plato's method took him on occasion
beyond his times, as when he observed that sex is not an
appropriate criterion in the education of philosopherleaders. We can then begin to locate and focus on other
striking instances of liberatory thinking within the tradition
itself. After all, what is more fascinating and more
important than discovering how even the privileged have
on occasion thought themselves free?
Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich
Transforming Knowledge, 181

[Aristotle's] method might in fact make use of deep
beliefs about the importance of choice to criticize the
actual social institutions concerning women. That Aristotle
does not do this says less about the possibilities of his
approach than about his own defects as a collector of
appearances. And if we examine the case before us we will
see, I believe, that it is not the method that is at fault, so
much as is Aristotle's application of it. For there are two
areas relevant to this problem [of erotic love] in which
Aristotle's scrutiny of beliefs is woefully deficient. His
investigation of the potential of women for excellence is
notoriously crude and hasty. He is able to bypass the
problem of developing their capabilities and he is able to
deny them a share in the highest philia, as a result of bare
assertions about their incapacity for full adult moral choice
that show no sign of either sensitivity or close attention.
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Had he devoted to the psychology of women, or even to
their physiology (about which he makes many ludicrous
and easily corrigible errors) even a fraction of the sustained
care that he devoted to the lives and bodies of shellfish, the
method would have been better served. . . . That none of
these things happened, even in this judicious and fairminded man who had, in general, such admirable views
about self-correction and self-scrutiny, who laid such stress
upon responsiveness and particular perception, shows us
the tremendous power of sexual convention and sexual
prejudice in shaping a view of the world. It was the one
area of life in which he was so deeply immersed that he
could not compensate for bias or partiality, he could not
even follow his own method, on the way to becoming a
person of practical wisdom.
Martha Nussbaum
Fragility of Goodness, 371

I
The two passages offered above represent
fundamentally different manners of teaching and learning
in the contemporary academe. The writers are both
philosophers, they are both female (though this fact about
them, as we shall see, is incidental to the purposes of the
present essay), they are contemporary citizens of the United
States, and they both agree about the fact that Aristotle, a
figure of major importance in the "Western philosophical
tradition" (a designation that is a major problem for the
first writer and a helpful convention for the second one,
who uses it repeatedly and without the warning quotation
marks), is a sexist. The question of manners then arises,
not as a result of differences of time, place, gender, or
discipline but over the question of how to treat the thought
of another human being who was, both agree, a sexist.
The contrast between the manners of the two
passages could not be more stark. In the first case above,
Aristotle's sexism is treated as a systemically radical defect
in his "modes of thinking." Readers are therefore advised
to note this and then to look elsewhere for enlightenment.
This latter search should be guided by the location of
"striking instances of liberatory thinking" in other writers
whose works might then merit further consideration. In
the second case, Aristotle's sexism is construed as a
prejudice whose "tremendous power" over him and his
culture prevented him from applying his own method in
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his characteristically incisive and fair-minded manner.
Readers should therefore (this is implied, not stated)
continue to learn from Aristotle, for he has much to teach
them about fundamental human questions. His attitudes
toward women teach us how an unexamined "view of the
world" can cripple the application of even the richest
methods of human thought.
Why should we construe these contrasts as a matter of
manners? These differences might, after all, be matters of
intellectual judgment and interpretation, even simpler
matters of empirical fact. So, perhaps the first writer is
correct: Aristotle's sexism really was the direct result of his
"mode of thinking," not merely a deficient application of it.
If so, the second writer's apparent charity would be
misguided or excessive. Yes, the differences between the
two passages could be explained this way, and we could and
should then move to examine the relative merits of the two
sets of competing claims. In the present case, however,
these latter strategies are not open to us; therefore we must
mind our (and their) manners, not simply or even mainly
the matters that the two passages set before us.
To see why this is so, we must drop the passive voice,
attend to actual writers and the context of their statements,
and examine the results of the contrasts heretofore
articulated in their treatment of other human beings,
especially the thought of those "others." We must do this,
because, though Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich might have
argued for her claims about Aristotle's fundamentally
flawed "modes of thought," she chose not to make such
arguments. As a result of this choice, governed in part by a
larger indisposition to treat Aristotle fairly and carefully
(manners here), Minnich dismisses Aristotle as but one of
several examples of faulty thinking. Martha Nussbaum,
however, does argue at great length for her claim that
Aristotle's method is a powerful one for all human beings
who wish to think about how they ought to live. She is
disposed to be charitable, fair-minded, and balanced in her
appraisals of Aristotle's ideas and his methods.
As a
result, she has devoted much of her professional life to
thinking with and about Aristotle over the great questions
he and countless other men and women have raised .
Manners do have great consequences for how we think, for
what we think, and for the company we choose to keep in
our thinking and in our living.
This matter of manners is one of grave, contemporary
importance, extending far beyond the differences between
Minnich and Nussbaum and cutting across divisions of
race, class, gender, time, and place. Though the
immediate example turns upon a quarrel over the
significance of sexism in Aristotle, this matter of manners is
not at all confined to feminist or anti-feminist issues and
concerns. Instead, it concerns (at least) the quality of life
and thought in the contemporary academy, and for that
reason, I will continue to reflect upon the contrasts
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between these two writers as a way of focussing (and
therefore, I hope, deepening) my reflections upon this
much larger issue.

II
Minnich and Nussbaum are worth studying in some
detail on the subject of manners, not only because they
represent such sharply distinct manners of argument and
analysis but also because they permit us, through a closer
and more judicious study of their writings, to understand
the sources of these differences. Minnich's book,
Transforming Knowledge, should probably be required
reading for all faculty today: the issues that it addresses are
crucially important and pervasive. The book's basic task is
to analyze "the conceptual errors that lock the dominant
meaning system shaping liberal arts curricula into
exclusive, invidiously hierarchical sets of structures, values,
principles, beliefs, and feelings . . . "(31). The book has
many other virtues in addition to its overall importance. It
intends to open a conversation, not to compel consent. It
offers inter alia a number of very sound pedagogical
suggestions. It is written, for the most part, in a way that
deliberately seeks to engage a broad audience of educated
people, not a narrow one defined by highly technical or
gratuitously obscure vocabularies. Often, Minnich enacts
what she recommends, the transformation of knowledge.
In brief, Minnich's arguments need to be taken very
seriously by all of those involved in the enterprise of
education.
Because Minnich can be, and often is, so persuasive,
informative, and careful, readers must wonder about how
to account for frequent instances of bad manners that
pervade the book. Minnich frequently writes what she
cannot possibly mean. For example, she criticizes studies
of "Western Civilization," because they "tend very strongly
to be partial insofar as they do not seriously take in to
account other civilizations except as they have been
encountered by and then defined in relation to the
dominant few in the West (52)." This is rather like
criticizing a course in African History because it fails to
deal with China. The point she wants to make here (given
what she has written elsewhere) is that the current
academic establishment understands the whole of Western
Civilization in terms of a very small sample of Western,
white, wealthy, educated, male writers. This latter claim is
surely true, as the situation described is deplorable , and
worth making, but Minnich's imprecision here is but one
example of a confused and confusing understanding of
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"partiality" that pervades her work. The reader never
knows whether partiality, for Minnich, is inevitable in all
works and should hence be confessed and accepted or
whether some writers (say, those who have escaped the
phallocentrist fallacy) have attained a privileged position of
impartiality.
And some writers are very definitely "privileged" for
Minnich on the thinnest of grounds. Plato, though he is
definitely an essentialist and a consistent advocate of
universals and hierarchies (all positions that Minnich
deplores), nevertheless fares rather well in Minnich's
treatment, because he did not include gender as a relevant
consideration in determining who should be philosopherleaders. On the other hand, Kant and Aristotle, because
both of them made some ugly and offensive statements
about non-Western cultures and/or women, get very short
shrift. Kant made some silly and deeply prejudiced
statements about Arabs and women. So much for the
Critique of Pure Reason! (76) Jefferson was a racist.
Minnich reminds us of this well known and widely taught
fact almost to the point of incantation. It is apparently the
only thing we need to know about the author of the
Declaration of Independence or his cultural context. We
have already observed Minnich's treatment of Aristotle.
Manners like these are what gave "political
correctness" a bad name. It is aggravating to see them so
often on display in Transforming Knowledge, because they
mar what is otherwise a valuable book. And they will surely
be the passages that hostile readers will seize upon in order
to justify (mistakenly) their curt dismissal of Minnich in the
same way that Minnich summarily dismisses Kant. These
bad manners are also very puzzling. We should therefore
ask and try to answer the same question that Minnich
should have asked about Aristotle (should have, because she
constantly exhorts us to practice thorough and careful
contextual analysis): are these bad manners the result of
Minnich's "mode of thought" or are they momentary lapses
of sound judgment, intemperate remarks that come about
as the result of prejudices peculiar to her world?
Martha Nussbaum's work will be very useful in
helping us to answer this question, not simply or even
mainly because she provides a sharp contrast to Minnich,
but also because she identifies the sources of many of (what
I have called) the bad manners of the academy. Nussbaum
is really interested in putting many of us back in close
touch with those longings that led us to read and study in
the first place. Many of us wanted (some still want) to
learn how to live well, to pursue human excellence, and to
become wiser than we were before we began to study.
Nussbaum reminds us of how we (perhaps) once read,
argues brilliantly for the cognitive powers of feeling, and
suggests finally that we are, to some extent, how we read as
much as, possibly more than, what we read. She is
interested in showing us how reading forms us or how,
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given the proper attention, it might best form us. With
only one exception, an exception that will be important,
Nussbaum treats other writers with patient, even
painstaking thoughtfulness, including those with whom she
basically disagrees. Like Minnich, Nussbaum enacts what
she recommends, even to the point of inventing new
genres of scholarly writing in order, quite self-consciously,
to bring form and content into a unity of purpose.
Nussbaum is always-well, almost always- "well
mannered."
That matters of manners should be connected for all
of us to how and why we read should not surprise us.
Nussbaum shows us how, in works of literature, content
(the matter) is inseparable from style (the manner). She
shows us further that a certain manner of reading, one that
is guided by the fundamental question of how we should
live, is more apt to put us in touch with the intentions of
the works before us than other manners that are bound by
narrower, more fashionable, and more tendentious
agendas. When Minnich displays bad manners, this is
almost always because she has become temporarily allied,
sometimes consciously and sometimes unknowingly, with
certain academic fashions like deconstructionism and poststructuralism that make reading into either a kind of free
and careless play or into a sinister and momentous kind of
power game. The one time that Nussbaum displays "bad
manners" is when she is attacking Stanley Fish who blithely
endorses and advances both of these pernicious
contemporary tendencies (220-29).

III
I remarked earlier that manners like those that
Minnich occasionally displays have given "political
correctness" a bad name, but the converse is true as well.
"Political correctness" has given "manners" a bad name.
Several of the Cresset colloquium participants urged me to
drop the word manners from the present essay on the
grounds that the word carried with it unfortunate historical
baggage. They pointed out quite correctly that the whole
issue of manners has for years been raised by men against
women who have been thought "shrill" or "ill-mannered"
in academic and other contexts whenever they sought to
assert themselves. I was therefore probably well advised to
"find some new term" lest the present essay be taken to be
yet another and more insidious instance of sexism.
I retained the term nevertheless, and for several
reasons. First, I simply could not think of another word
that captures the ethical, the conventional, and the
8

methodological dimensions of human thought and
speech. Second, as I have already indicated, the matter of
manners currently has little or nothing to do with
feminism, anti-feminism, or sexism. Indeed, so far as I can
tell, displays of bad manners appear fairly evenly
distributed across all categories of race, gender, and
ideology. The problem is that the numbers of illmannered persons seem to be increasing in all groups.
Third, and most important, I want to argue against the
widely prevalent notion that manners of speaking and
matters of speaking are altogether separable. Nussbaum is
not only well mannered herself, she also, by insisting upon
and arguing for the inextricable connections between style
and content, between the manner of writing and the
matter of it, shows us why manners are so vitally important.
We would nevertheless do well at this point to remind
ourselves of George Bernard Shaw's dictum to the effect
that the rich can afford not to be moral and the poor
cannot afford to be moral-only middle class people have
the time and inclination to concern themselves with
manners and morals. In short, we should all be suspicious
of persons who, like myself, have been for years close to
certain centers of academic power and who have tolerated
bad manners in their fellows (a deliberate and accurate
choice of words here) but who now have suddenly become
concerned about the manners of others who have been
and sometimes continue to be excluded for no good
reasons from the conversations that take place within the
academy. In short, Minnich's dismissal of Aristotle is a
minor problem compared to what will perhaps be a much
wider dismissal of Minnich. "Be Kent unmannerly when
Lear is mad."
Kent is unmannerly, because, on the occasion of this
utterance, he is attempting to speak the truth to a power
both crazed and dangerous. This extreme, limiting case
suggests at one and the same time the rare, appropriate
occasions for unmannerly speech and the principal reason
that we should concern ourselves with manners at all. We
should care for manners, because we must care for and
about the truth of matters. And we are, I think ,
increasingly in a condition where unmannerliness is
leading to foolishness and falsehood.
Minnich's ill-mannered treatment of Aristotle leads
her to faulty judgments about the worth and importance of
his ideas, but it also unfortunately represents the most
typical and the most dangerous form of academic bad
manners today: the peremptory dismissal of the thoughts
and ideas of others. A colleague of mine at another
university recently informed me that she has been socially
and intellectually ostracized from certain circles, because
she has published articles in a particular journal. She
writes for an enormous number of publications, ranging
widely across ideological and scholarly spectra, but for
several of her colleagues, writing for this one, particular
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journal is an act of treason. None of these colleagues,
however, have taken the trouble (so far as she can tell) to
discover what she wrote in the journal in question . In the
meanwhile a male colleague at my own university, speaking
of a certain female literary critic, tells me that he refuses to
read any of "her stufr' any longer, ever since she allegedly
made a particularly "strident" remark at a conference he
attended three years ago.
These are not isolated episodes, and they are, I think,
closely related to another contemporary academic
tendency, the peremptory acceptance of certain thoughts
on the basis of the race, class, gender, or ideological
predilections of the speaker. Fewer and fewer people are
making the elementary distinction between the cogent
claim that a full understanding of the meaning and
significance of any given utterance might well include an
understanding of the speaker's social location and
epistemic context and the dangerous claim that the truth of
any given utterance is contingent upon the identity of the
person who uttered it. Academics have always been more
disposed than any of them would admit to ad hominem styles
of argument, but these arguments are now being made on
all sides with alarming frequency, because they have been
given spurious and fashionable legitimation by the same
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pernicious teaching that occasionally tripped Minnich up,
namely that "truth" just is a form of power, an ideological
formation that can and should be changed at will, not for
reasons.

The same people often advance the cause of
academic tribalism (every group its own truth) even as they
clamor for increasing diversity. This is bad faith, bad
politics, and bad manners. We cannot welcome strangers if
we have forgotten what it means to be hospitable. We
cannot consider others' ideas if we have lost the ability to
be considerate. And we cannot credibly advocate diversity
if we do not provide a context and cultivate an ethos in
which diversity can be constructive. This does not mean
either bland tolerance of all views or its opposite, the love
of one's own tribal views and a corresponding hatred of
others. It means constructive and often conflict-ridden
engagement with difference: in a word, thoughtfulness.
And to be thoughtful means to have a good mind and to
have good manners, to be filled with the truth because we
are filled with consideration for the thoughts and ideas of
others. If we do not mind our manners in the academy, we
will eventually lose the truth because we will have already
lost one another. 0
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Two Poems by John Ruff

April's Flower
for Margaret

Someday, Margaret, your teacher may make you read a poem
by T. S. Eliot,
a sad old man with a huge head, that grew so big with
important ideas
it hardly fits into his photograph-a curious fact
I noticed just this evening;
funny, isn't it, how I miss the most obvious things?

I had left his book face down on my desk-the way I often
leave them-to keep my place
(sometimes piled up they look like birds with square wings
that have died in flight and landed in a stack),
and when I returned to my desk it was his sad mug I saw
staring out at me from the dust jacket.
I had been reading one of his poems, the one that begins
by saying April is the cruelest month,

which you and I both know is only partially true, because
the first six days stretch on forever,
then your birthday comes and in a glorious flash
it's over for another year,
but for that day you do not have to drink your milk
or make your bed and for dinner
it's whatever you want-this year pizza
from Pinocchio'sand there are presents and cards, some with money that
flutters out.
10
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Somedays, Margaret, even in April, I must look like him
to you:
nothing but a forehead with its creases, sinking like the
moon behind a barren horizon of books.
And I haven't his excuse: poor man with only initials
for a first name,
he never had a daughter with walkie-talkies
and a cat she named Maxine;
I'll bet for his birthday he never got a bird like I did,
hatched out of an envelope
you made come gloriously unglued, with pastel feathers
pinstriped on,
and purple dangly legs you stapled on for the way
they dance in the wind.
If someone like you had made him a calendar for Christmas
with flowers painted in water colors
for all the months like mine; well, who knows what might
have happened.
This month, and at this moment, and more than ever
April's flower graces my desk,
a pyramid of pink buds rising up out of a dark green bowl
upon a stem as delicate as a wren's feather,
a tiny reed that draws my spirits up to buds on top,
which hover there, weightless as their maker's joy.
Could a person look at such a flower, or think of you,
Margaret, and not become perfectly light-headed.
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"Love's Knowledge"
In the Politics, Aristotle
says that the two things that
above all make people love and
care for something are the
thought that it is all their
own and the thought that it's
the only one they have ...
Martha Nussbaum, in Love's Knowledge

It doesn't matter to Margaret that he's only a lizard
with a brain smaller than a pea-or that she got him second hand
well past his prime, already named, with just a stump for a tail
and an aversion to meal worms so that she must shake and bake
his crickets in vitamins or his skin breaks out in bumpshe's the apple of her eye and tonight she thinks he's lonely,
perhaps he's in love, and what is she to do?
Tonight from her bed she watched him perform a flurry of pushups
for her cat, and then his throat blew up like he'd swallowed
a strawberry, according to the diagram in her book on lizards
"a ritual of courtship" and "a prelude to mating." Poor thing,
I must admit he knows a lovely creature when he sees oneand he's shrewd enough to guess that she's the one to come on to
and not the calico. But even Maxine, so shy and gentle,
could never be this lovesick lizard's] uliet. To get Margaret
back to bed I tell her not to worry, saying lizards often do
such things to tell other creatures not to mess with them,
to bug off, take a hike, and quit staring. I tell her I know
exactly how her lizard feels about wanting his privacy
once in a while, especially after a long day, and when I look
down at my paper I know she knows exactly what I mean.
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Try as I might, though, she's not persuaded she's mistaken
the meaning of that lump in his throat. Call it what you will,
loneliness or love or the absurd lust of a confused old lizard,
she knows what she's seen, believes what she knows,
but the question remains, what to do? She'd buy him a mate
but fears they'd fight, they might mutilate each other or
one of them might die. Even if they hit it off, old as he is
the excitement could kill him, and what if she turned a cold
shoulder-curled up instead around the electrical cord
and left him with the hot rock to warm his blood. He's prone
to dark moods, and no great conversationalist, a battle-scarred
old veteran grown set in his ways. If he ever did catch
some young female's fancy, who's to say he'd share the crickets,
or make for her a place on the log the morning after?
With Margaret in bed, I return to my paper, to distract myself
from her lizard's plight with stories about baseball,
famine and war. A lizard is such a little thing compared
to a pennant race, CEO salaries, and genocide in Somaliashe'lllearn that soon enough I suppose. We all do.
If we didn't, who could sleep? Dumb as I am about lizards and
love, that much I've learned, and now the lump's in my throat.

John Ruff
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The Music Men
Steven Reames
It's Sunday evening, the last
night of the Annual Pledge Drive for
KSPS TV, Channel 7, Public TV for
Spokane and the Inland Empire. As
always, the Friends of Seven are a few
new donors and a few thousand dollars
short of their goal. The campaign
planners knew they would be, and they
knew they would need a big night on
Sunday, so they have planned for it.
They
know
they
need
programing that will draw well and last
long enough to string the audience
along through several last-ditch pledge
breaks: that calls for a movie. It needs
to be a little different from Arnold
Schwartzenegger on cable: therefore
an old movie, but not just anything
from Saturday Night Cinema; it needs
to be a major entertainment classic.
Sunday night means programing for
the whole family, something the older
folks (the ones with money) will like
but also something that holds appeal
Steven Reames teaches in the Department
of Communication at Spokane Falls
Community College. His article about
football on tv and baseball on radio
appeared in The Cresset in January
1992.
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for the young marrieds and the
grandkids, too: how about a romantic
comedy? Of course the very last night
of the pledge drive demands
something that just naturally leads to
special premiums keyed to pledge
dollars:
okay, a musical with
soundtrack tape and CD. All told, the
station needs something bright, warm,
upbeat,
unobjectionable,
AllAmerican: that's right, The Music Man.
The plan worked at my house.
When I read the title in the TV listings,
I remembered how excited I had been
as a child at the Garland Theater,
listening to the grand finale in Voice
of the Theater sound, watching all that
Technicolor brass and those bright red
uniforms appear miraculously under
the pure blue Iowa/Hollywood, widescreen sky. So I grabbed my kids,
made popcorn, and sat down to
weather one dozen pledge breaks for
the sake of seventy-six trombones.
After the popcorn was gone,
however, long before the stretched
version of The Music Man was over and
well before the final pledge break, my
son had gone off to bed, and his older
sister had drifted off to a teenagepriority phone call. I was left alone
with the fund drive and a 19-inch
version of my memories to learn
something about the American
character.
We love Professor Harold Hill.
Long ago in River City, Iowa; at the
end of the Fifties in Hollywood, USA;
in Spokane, Washingon, circa 1992:
we love his spell-binding salesman's
spiel, his Robert Preston jaw, his littleboy charm, and (We Knew It All
Along) his good heart. Those of us in
the audience may chuckle to ourselves
about the gullibility of the
townspeople who buy Hill's message,
his moth-eaten and faded uniforms,
and his "Think Method" of musical
non-instruction. (What kind of rubes
would buy the idea of learning to play
just by thinking about playing?) But we
don't really blame him or them
because we know it will turn out all
right. Led by Marian the Librarian, we
are more than ready to join the
townspeople in celebrating the
miraculous transfiguration of Harold

Hill and The Band as they play
"Seventy-Six Trombones." Just like the
good citizens of River City, we buy in.
During the closing credits, when the
Anvil Salesman (the man who tried to
blow the whistle on Hill's previous
scams) drops his sample case on his
foot-CLANG!-we laugh, knowing
that justice has been served.
Of course we bought in long
before the end. We bought in when
we bought our tickets or turned on the
TV.
We made a contract with
Hollywood: we pay and suspend our
disbelief; they entertain us and make
us feel good. When Hollywood made
The Music Man, they made good on
their end of the deal. They converted
Meredith Willson's fine Broadway play
into a fine film. The singing and the
dancing and the sets and the costumes
are wonderful. The cast does a fine
job. Above all, Robert Preston is
superb as Harold Hill; he is completely
involved and yet just short of winking
at the audience to let us know it's all
just for fun. But as I watched The
Music Man this time on KSPS, I began
to feel a little uneasy. I began to
notice something- something besides
the pure entertainment of a big
production well done; something
besides Robert Preston; something
emerging from the plot itself;
something to do with the apotheosis of
Harold Hill and our eagerness to
believe.
At every level, the final scene is
what we'd wish for ourselves in our
more self-indulgent dreams. As
members of the band, we would love
to become great musicians and to
make our parents smile and the
townspeople cheer-without having to
practice. As parents and townsfolk, we
would love to share vicariously in our
children's success, to be able to boast
of the band-this beautifully-dressed
symbol of corporate pride-without
having to pay full price in time or
money. As Marian, we would love to
save that handsome rogue, to turn him
into the man of our dreams by the
power of our love, and then to share
his glory-without having to worry
about how long we can make the
miracle stick.
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Most of all, we would love to be
Harold Hill. To prance at the head of
the parade with True Love. To listen
to the sound of the band we have
created. To hear the cheers of the
crowd. And to do it all on the strength
of our personal charm and the secret
good intentions that have turned our
fraud into a stunningly successful
public reality. We probably mind very
little that the man who sought to call
us to account is now discredited as a
liar. To laugh when he drops his
anvils on his own foot is a good way to
forget about who was telling the truth.
Even sitting in our own seats, we
love to be taken back to an earlier,
cleaner America where people like us
were good at heart and everything we
did turned out for the best. Our
nostalgic dream is pleasant in and of
itself and also makes us feel we are
entitled to the rest of our selfindulgent fantasies. Nostalgia gently
reminds us that we, as a people, have
always been good, easily-forgiven, and
deservedly-blessed.
Self-indulgent nostalgia served
up by the right pitchman is a treat we
can't resist. The combination played
well for the movie's original audience
thirty years ago, and it played well,
enchanced by the secondary nostalgia
of seeing the movie again after all
these years, on KSPS in 1992. All
through the evening's pledge breaks
the studio phones kept ringing as the
spokesperson reminded viewers how
badly public TV needed their support
in order to continue to provide quality
programming like The Music Man .
Guided by the speaker's appeals,
viewers responded to the film in the
most direct way possible: with money.
From where I sat, the irony of using
this film-about a fraud so successful
it becomes reality-as a tool to secure
donations-appeared lost on donors
and pitchman alike.
Moreover, I began to wonder
about just what the money was buying.
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I was sure that much of the money was
a response to the film's high
entertainment values, but as I watched
the film move to its rousing
conclusion, I couldn't help but feel
the enduring force of its appeal to our
self-indulgent dream of what we have
been and what we want to be. How
much of that money was a vote for The
Music Man's myth of who we are? And
who are we kidding?
Watching The Music Man from
the perspective of 1992 reminded me
of the continuing political power of
that Hollywood dream of an innocent
and victorious and lovable America. It
also gave me the opportunity for a
little political nostalgia of my own.
Harold Hill's unscathed rise to glory
gave me a new appreciation for the
remarkable success and popularity of
Robert Preston's contemporary,
Ronald Reagan.
Armed with the Hollywood values
of good looks, great timing, and
limitless charm, Reagan took the role
of Harold Hill to undreamed-of
heights on a new medium, political
television. He used TV to sell the
nation a Music Man version of what we
wanted to believe about ourselves. In
1980, Reagan's spiel played especially
well in contrast to the unpleasant
message of sacrifice, conservation and
restraint we'd been hearing for four
years from that dour Anvil Salesman,
Jimmy Carter. We were tired of
hearing that our problems were our
own responsibilites. How much more
true it sounded to hear that we really
weren't to blame. How much nicer it
was to listen to, and to believe,
Reagan's promise to make us as grand
and prosperous as we were in the
Good Old Days. How comforting it
was to hear how little we would have to
pay. We voted accordingly.
Four years later, the TrickleDown Theory (that economic version
of the Think Method) was in full
swing, and Reagan marched to beat

the band. "Ask yourself," said the
voice on the television, "Are you better
off now then you were four years ago?"
Harold Hill could not have put it
better himself. Reagan won reelection by a landslide.
Reagan may not have been able
to walk on water or to dance as well as
Robert Preston, but for eight years he
was able to skate free-past cracks in
the Economy, around the deep water
of the Deficit, over the thin ice of
Scandal-maintaining great personal
popularity right on into retirement. If
some Doom-Sayer suggested Reagan's
performance wasn't up to promise, we
could always turn on the TV to see and
to hear the President Himself
reassuring us that things were Just
Great. And if Reality insisted on
looking dreary, it was Someone Else's
Fault-ClANG!
Reagan was sustained by his
audience. We wanted Reagan to keep
the act going because if we could keep
believing in his performance, then we
could keep believing his message-our
favorite message-just like in the
movies. Preston's Harold Hill was able
to make the magic last until the band
was ready to play "Seventy-Six
Trombones." Ronald Reagan as The
President made it work for two terms
and then exited arm-in-arm with
Nancy, accompanied by the Marine
Corps Band. Can you name that tune?
Reagan has been a hard act to
follow. Even though his numbers all
sound familiar, George never has
looked the least bit like Robert
Preston. Perot did a good soft shoe,
but his act ran a little short. Clinton
has a nice, big, toothy smile, and
Hillary would be great as Marian, but I
still don't know how to cast Gennifer.
Thank goodness I can still watch
the original cast on KSPS. Maybe I'd
better make that donation. 0

15

Politics as Comic Art
James Combs

My fondest memory of graduate
school was the chance to meet
Kenneth Burke. Graduate school is an
especially refined form of academical
torture, and after five years of
exquisite pain I had just about
abandoned any hope of fmding much
of anything worth studying further.
(Recall that this was after too many
years of reading political science, the
true dismal science not only in subject
matter but also in turgid prose style
that weights the brain after years of
immersion.) I was at that stage of
graduate studies known to many
veterans of "advanced programs" as a
kind of exhausted funk in which one is
not sure that now everything or
nothing is known. In short, I was
looking around for something to do a
dissertation on. At this point, a lot of
graduate aspirants get stuck.
Fortunately for me, something
interesting emerged.
I started reading Kenneth
Burke. I was led to him through an
James Combs is currently on leave of
absence from VU. He is at the moment
working on a book entitled Phony
Culture, and is most recently the author of
The New Propaganda, and some
maroelous tomato plants.
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interest in "symbolic politics," a
literature wherein various social
scientists kept citing Burke. Reading
Burke is truly like swimming through
wet sand, but I found his expansive
and essentially aesthetic view of things
appealing. Then, as it so happened,
he was a visiting professor at a nearby
university, and I got several
departments to go in together and
bring Burke to our campus. I escorted
him around for two days, and found
him fascinating-irascible, learned,
energetic, open to new ideas,
combative in discussion, anal-fixated,
ingratiating, and alcoholic. If I were
ever to write one of those "My Most
Unforgettable Character" kind of
stories for The Reader's Digest, he'd be
it. For one thing, he had read
everything, and was deeply versed in
the world's great writers, including
stuff I'd never even heard of (worldclass scholars can really dazzle you with
the breadth of their erudition: two
other big-leaguers I admire, Northrop
Frye and Isaiah Berlin, are
breathtaking to read, not only for what
they have to say but their grasp of the
literature on virtually any major
subject, from Shakespeare to liberty).
For another, Burke knew
everybody that was anybody in
twentieth-century American letters.
He was no name-dropper; m
conversation, it was clear that these
were just the people he knew: poets
ranging from his Greenwich Village
roommate Hart Crane and his Dial pal
Marianne Moore through his
colleague at Bennington Theodore
Roethke down to his long-time friend
and laureate Howard Nemerov;
novelists (he told of splitting a bottle
of Jack Daniels with William Faulkner
one evening) such as Ralph Ellison;
and most of all, critics (he and
Malcolm Cowley went to high school
together, and had a memorable, and
now
collected,
lifelong
correspondence) he both liked
(Stanley Edgar Hyman) and disliked
(Edmund Wilson, who he heatedly
accused, all these many years later, of
once stealing his ideas about Henry
James's The Turn of the Screw). Finally,
Burke was a convivial and tireless

conversationalist, with a legendary
capacity for alcohol (at age 74, he
drank a much younger group of us
under the table; we were all stiffed
while he kept expounding).
I wound up doing a dissertation
about Burke. I discovered that he had
indeed influenced social scientists
interested in the "dramatistic"
perspective on society, and that other
social philosophers, such as Georg
Simmel and George Herbert Mead,
were on something of the same trail.
Burke's intellectual reputation has
grown over the years, especially since
he has survived, and as of this
juncture, is still alive and writing at age
95 (both his brain and his liver deserve
study). There is now a Kenneth Burke
Society that meets every other year to
contemplate "Burkology", and Burke
himself attended, enfeebled but feisty,
the 1991 meeting in New Harmony,
Indiana. He is coming embarrassingly
close to achieving intellectual
apotheosis, a status he heartily resists
(by threatening to resign from the
KBS, insisting that what he said should
not be carved in stone, and amending
always what you had thought you had
finally figured out that he is saying).
Burke's social perspective he
dubbed "dramatism", and through the
work of such social scientists as Erving
Coffman and Hugh D. Duncan the
dramatistic perspective became
important. As a world metaphor,
dramatism offers many insights into
the social process, since it does focus
our attention on those symbolic
actions social actors undertake which
are best explained as histrionic. It
does not explain as well the more
instrumental, or material, aspects of
social life. It is true that, for example,
economic activity surrounds itself with
much symbolic trapping (e.g., the
dramaturgy of bank design, the
potlatch rituals of lavish waste among
the super-rich), and economic events
(crashes,
booms)
are
often
characterized as if they are dramatic.
But many social scientists remain
unconvinced that the language of the
theater adequately explains or
"captures" the
movement of
international capital or the realities of
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corporate rule. Burkeans counter that
money, and the love of money, is no
less symbolic than any other motive or
effort, and that the drama of getting
more is no less dramatic simply
because it is crass and grasping and
the actors philistines and barbarians.
Social drama occurs wherever there is
something of value over which people
contest, and which therefore creates
the conditions for social drama.
In any case, Burke's dramatism has
evolved in social inquiry into a useful
heuristic device. A few of us in the
bastardized field of "political
communication" have tried to explain
aspects of politics as drama. Here
again the perspective works better in
some areas of politics than others.
Campaigns, for example, are
amenable to dramatistic analysis; the
processes of budget-making less so.
But the idea does admit that for both
actors and audiences, politics is an
aesthetic experience, something
understood as drama, even though it
may be a very bad drama, badly acted,
with dumb plots and undesirable
denouements. This may apply to
ideologies and political systems:
communism, it turns out, was not an
epic of good or evil (depending on
your point of view) but rather a very
bad melodrama that came apart in the
last act; fascism was similar, with the
additional feature of mass tragedy and
epic self-immolation. But both these
twentieth-century
movements
displayed in practice all of the drearier
features of popular melodrama: a
perilous struggle over moral justice as
the proper outcome of political
history, won through the trials and
sacrifices of the virtuous, who bring
the inevitable but difficult defeat and
disgrace of the demonized enemy and
a happy ending with the good guys
triumphant.
Both Nazis and
Communists saw themselves as the
heroes of history, but their own
failings brought about their selfdestruction and the triumph of the
Western democratic moral drama, or
so we tell ourselves now with anxious
assurances about the certainty of the
"end of history." In such political
dramas, the play was the thing that
September 1992

kept the conflict going, since it was the
suspense of the thickened plot and the
threat of calamity that kept us alert to
the story. Now that our Cold War
melodrama is over, and we think we
won, we feel a great sense of letdown
and loss because the conflict that
sustained our self-image of superiority
and destiny is now gone; the end of
the story did us the immense disservice
of taking our enemy away.
There is also at this moment a
great sense that democracy, seemingly
the great victory of history's recent
morality play, doesn't seem to work so
well. It is true that communism and
fascism turned out to be astoundingly
inefficient, one of the melodramatic
ironies of their commitment to
heretical villainy (even the Nazi
Holocaust, the tragic component of
their rule, for all the efficiencies
utilized in mass murder, made them
all the more inefficient at war on two
fronts, tying up one-tenth of their
locomotives and one-fifth of their
rolling stock, by some estimates). But
now in the throes of elections
everywhere, from Britain to Moldavia
to South Africa to the U.S., there is an
undercurrent of doubt about the
efficacy, and even the wisdom, of
democracy. Here at the end of history,
with no ideological challenge around
to a growing consensus on liberal
democracy, why is there all this doubt
about the workings of democracy?
The 1992 American elections, one
might have thought, would occur in
the context of a proud and confident
electorate and polititate actively
participating in a system and ideology
now deemed vindicated by history.
Instead, it has become for much of the
public a discouraging spectacle of
coached candidates attacking each
other over matters trivial and
inconsequential, with tabloids bent on
unearthing every teen-age traffic ticket
or whatnot that proves the inconstancy
of a candidate, millions spent on
hatchetmen to run "negative" ads
assassinating the character of their
boss's opponent, a plethora of
promises, platitudes, and panaceas
which are all empty, resulting in an
increasingly alienated and mad

electorate that stays away from the
polls in droves. (My favorite bumper
sticker this year: "Don't Vote. Itjust
Encourages Them".)
This curious condition of
democracy at the alleged precise
historical moment of its ascendancy
should give us pause. Perhaps Burke
can help us here too.
While
totalitarian states tend toward the
melodramatic, and aristocracies and
monarchies set the stage for tragedy,
democracy, Burke argues, is basically
comic. True, there are democratic
tragedies (the fall of elected kings
such as Nixon) and democratic
melodramas (the McCarthyite witch
hunts, "wars" on poverty, crime, drugs,
or corruption), but the dominant
dramatic motif in democracies is
comedy.
Indeed, democracy is
supposed to be comic. Democratic
politics recognizes that human selfrule is neither necessarily wise nor
efficient, but at least it often avoids the
high seriousness of political "cults of
tragedy" (the self-destructive Nazis) or
melodramatic cant (the pomposities of
dictators). Democracies have the
chance of avoiding such nonsense if
they recognize the incongruity
between the ideal and the real and
find the gap funny. In an odd way,
democracies flourish not because of
belief but because of disbelief. Thus
the more comic ire that is heaped on
the system, the more chance it has of
survival; when democracies take
themselves too seriously, they are in
danger of becoming undemocratic.
The truly critical and indispensable
role in a democracy is not the king or
the priest but the jester. (Think of all
of the undemocratic institutions you
know-corporations,
unions,
universities, churches, or whatever: is
it not the case that they can handle a
great deal of "serious" criticism, but
have much more trouble with
ridicule?)
In the Burkean view of democracy,
the incongruity of democracy is
overcome through the exercise of
comic "sanctioned doubt", helping us
to overcome romantic notions of
heroic political adventure and tragic
fantasies of noble failure in which the
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heavens fall, and millions perish, to
prove the merit of our arrogance. The
jesters-comics, satirists, ironists,
parodists, joketellers, mimics,
lampooners, polemicists-serve the
interests of democracy by portraying
the practice of politics as a comedy.
For them, politics is a comic art form,
one that serves the vital function of
perpetuating healthy skepticism about
politics and politicians. Skepticism is
sustained when those who rule us are
made into a joke, a caricature, a funny
story, or whatever, transforming the
potentially pompous or self-important
into a decidedly comic mortal.
Political comedy in this sense is in the
grand tradition of Swift, Twain,
Mencken, and Orwell, but in all cases
it is profoundly egalitiarian, asserting
that rulers are subject to comic
irreverence by those who find their
hilarious efforts at rule a vanity
unworthy of the bonfire. By so doing,
democratic rulers are brought hurtling
to earth through the humbling force
of being made to look ridiculous.
Political comedy makes politics and
politicians into objects of play,
inspiring our active engagement with
the process as something that is fun to
watch as long as you understand it is
comedy and should not be taken too
seriously. That playful attitude makes
for a skepticism that sees politics as
something too important to miss
because it is usually the funniest show
in town.
There is, however, a danger in
treating politics as comedy. The
skeptic maintains a kind of ironic
detachment from politics, a stance that
prevents or undermines passionate
attachment to democratic ideals, and
more immediately, a political figure,
party, or proposal. But at its worst,
political comedians can so savage the
system and its players that they are
reduced to a state of immobility
through the denial of pJblic trust and
support. I fear that is where we are in
the politics of 1992. Both politicians
and politics have taken such a beating
from all those in the media who feed
on the comic view that their ability to
govern is seriously undermined.
Sensing that the public is ready for
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political wilding, contemporary media
observers from newspeople to stand-up
comics have so subjected the system
and those in it to such comic scrutiny
that they threaten to make every
politician into a total joke and politics
itself into a frivolous diversion.
Politicians are viewed as a kind of alien
and subhuman race without the usual
saving grace of comedy of sharing a
common, if funny, humanity with the
rest of us. Not only does this reinforce
mass cynicism about a system that
depends upon public support, it also
increases passive resignation among
the electorate who find observing the
process amusing but not worthy of
being a part of us, most dramatically,
voting. The comics convince the
public of their moral and intellectual
superiority over those who would rule,
so we thereby remain smugly settled in
front of our TV without serious
thought as to what political choices we
might make for the future of the
country. We have reduced democracy
to snickers and smirks, seeing politics
such as campaigning as a form of
pornography, on the same moral and
intellectual level as wrestling and wet
T-shirt contests.
This mass comic attitude is part of
a larger social problem, our current
unwillingness to take anything
seriously, including our own decline as
a nation. Perhaps passive cynicism is
to be expected in such a time, with our
historical moorings so lost and our
emotional and financial treasury so
bankrupted. As with so many things,
our mass-mediated universe seems to
have made us unable to believe that
politics matters, and that democracy
only works if it matters to enough
people. Politics may be too important
to take seriously, but that does not
mean that as an integral part of the
human comedy it is not important.
Democracy is something that can
atrophy very quickly if it cannot find
ways to renew and revitalize itself.
Comics may rightly attack a system that
is in many ways corrupt and idiotic,
but what they dare not attack is the
likelihood that the people themselves
have become corrupted. We may be
faced with the horrifying lbsenian

possibility that the enemy of the
people is the people themselves, but
no one dare point this out, either in
seriousness or in jest In such a state,
the rule of the people will not allow
for the rule of the people.
How long a democratic society
can last in an atmosphere of mass
cynicism and detachment is a good
question.
It may be that the
astonishing widespread sense that
developed after the Gulf war that
things were in rapid disarray and that
our historical moment has now passed
cannot be undone, at least in current
political circumstances. Nor do we
want the comics to shut up: for many
people, their savage attacks on the
system and its politicians may seem a
sane and sensible response to the
mere anarchy that is loosed on the
world. Recall that the Roman satirist
Juvenal, writing in the second century
A.D., was asked why he wrote satire:
he replied that it was hard not to write
satire. Political comedy may be an
appropriate response in a Silver Age,
one that expresses the sudden
recognition of political absurdity. A
widespread attitude of absurdity occurs
in conjunction with hopelessness. In
1992, comic art speaks to that
sensibility that politics is both absurd
and hopeless, but we may wonder
whether entertaining such a view is for
the moment a mass defense against
nihilism. If democracy has been
reduced to entertainment that sustains
people in their lack of belief, then we
may expect that its traditional
functions have deteriorated, and that
in the future political democracy in
America will mean, and be, something
quite different, and perhaps
something quite unprecedented. If so,
future historians will trace the origins
of a "comic state" in the late twentieth
century, and may well find that the
election of 1992 was, in the jargon of
that age, a defining moment
But we grow altogether too
solemn. If Burke's way of looking at
things has any merit, it is in his
constant ability to be astonished and
amused by what human beings say and
do. His intellectual talent is in playing
with ideas--proposing outrageous
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connections, new perspectives by
incongruity, employing a mind, as
Nemerov said, that cannot stop
exploding. Burke's attitude is what we
might call jocose (from the Latin for
jesting):
he is playful towards
understanding those things that
matter most deeply, and thus achieves
understanding through a kind of
comic sagacity. He has even proposed
the notion that "mankind's only hope
is a cult of comedy," wherein the
"laughing animal" triumphs through
his cultivation of jocosity over more
somber cults of tragedy and
melodrama. We should all become
Marxists, but of the Groucho rather
than the Karl variety, and study the
true political deconstructionists of
Duck Soup. If we can see politics as
part of the human comedy, then we
can truly understand that politics, like
life, is too important a thing to
approach with excessive worry and

solemnity, and too fascinating a
spectacle to fret over. Burke's life and
work remind us that the intellectual
life can be one of the fun of discovery,
what we might call the comedy of
inquiry. (In this connection, I am
reminded that French Bibles render
the part about "blessed are the meek"
as "blessed are the de bon aire--of good
disposition.")
In 1992, then, Burke should
remind us that democratic politics,
most amazingly in its electoral
competition, is a wonderfully comic
political theatre of the absurd. For
those who cultivate comic sagacity,
elections come to be seen as a
fascinating display of comedic logic.
Where else could you see such
astonishing assertions, such as blaming
the Los Angeles riots on a television
character? Could any fiction writer
conjure up a "populist billionaire" who
flirts with caesarism? Could any

playwright do justice to the political
"humours" that have appeared in only
one political season? (Perhaps the
medieval schema still has merit: in
1992, Bill Clinton was the sanguine,
Pat Buchanan and Jerry Brown the
cholerics,
Paul
Tsongas
the
phlegmatic, and George Bush the
melancholic.) We may decry the fact
that our electoral discourse is not the
Great Conversation of which Burke
feels such a part; we may console
ourselves by our amusement at the
antics and pratfalls of those in the
political barnyard. As the election of
1992 lurches to its uncertain climax,
let us remember, as H. L. Mencken
liked to say, that American elections
are the greatest free show on earth. In
that spirit, we can look at democratic
politics in sympathetic amusement and
not shallow condescension. Politicians
are, after all, very much our creation,
and they reflect and magnify the
comic flaws in the audience . 0

The Shining of All Griefs
He sat bathed in the shining light
with his back to the door. We in the family
circle were still, waiting for the shining
to speak. It touched him on the shoulders
of his blue jacket and from the soft waves of white
hair it shimmered. He was old but the light
lifted years and silvered the lines ofhis face.
My mother was the first to move. She glided
around our shadowy shapes and walked past him
into the light. He was the life and the death
of her, yet neither one spoke what they knew.
Suddenly his head fell into his hands
and he sobbed with a groan that shook us.
"Children," he said, wiping his sorrow with
bare hands. "Let the children come to me."
I rose first and slipped to his side.
"Father," I said, stroking the light of his face,
and the shining of all griefs filled the room.
Jan Bowman
September 1992
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Values 101
Arvid F. Sponberg
On Broadway two prize-winning
dramas are playing near each other.
Two Trains Running, the Pulitzer prize
winner by August Wilson, appears
nightly at the Walter Kerr Theater on
48th Street. Three blocks south, at the
Plymouth Theater, you can see the
Tony Award winner, Brian Friel's
Dancing at Lughnasa (LOO-nuh-suh).
The plays show the lives of two very
different groups of people but
beneath the plot, language, and stage
business, Wilson and Friel cling
fiercely to common values.
Oh, no. There's that word again:
values. I don't know about you but in
this political season I'm gagging on it.
Stifle the urge just a little longer,
though . I saw the plays on successive
nights and it seemed to me that Wilson
and Friel actually tethered the hyperinflated concept, got its feet back on
the ground, put a little zip in its step,
and then set it, well, in Friel's play,
dancing.
Gus Sponberg, a member of the
Department of English at VU is currently
on a research leave writing his latest theatre
book, A. R. Gurney: A Casebook, due
out with Garland Publishing in late 1993.
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We've got traditional values,
religious values, moral values, ethical
values, family values, educational
values,
environmental
values,
economic values, sexual values. All
God's chillun got values, and they all
seem to conflict with each other.
Trying to line them up is like trying to
line up your relatives to help take care
of the home place after you find a
nursing home for great-grandma.
Everyone approves of the general idea.
Then, working out why, what, when,
where, how, and after, before, from,
instead of, to, with, and without whom
gets nearly everybody spouting at
somebody and slapping the silent
treatment on somebody else.
The people in the plays by
Wilson and Friel face crises of values.
That's the plain though admittedly
rather vague way to put it. Somehow
they have to g e t their desires and
actions to line up with what is best for
themselves and the ir friends. And in
the treatment of th eir people, Wilson
and Friel contrast sharply with many of
our public leaders. Elected officials
and the leaders of corporations,
unions, ethnic groups, political
pressure groups, various "rights"
groups often dem ean us by prodding
our fears about our neighbors, our
circumstances, our future. They do
this to create cohesion among
supporters and to intimidate their
opponents. The fabric of our public
life tangles in the gears of factional
combat. It twists, tears, shreds, and,
finally, as we saw in south central L.A.,
disintegrates.
By contrast, Wilson and Friel take
the predicaments of their people

seriously, as ends in themselves, not
merely as a means to power. Rather
than masking and caricaturing, they
draw you into their characters' lives. As
a white person, I could, in theory, take
a seat in a diner in a poor, black
Pittsburgh neighborhood like the one
August Wilson depicts in Two Trains
Running. But, in practice, as soon as I
did, a kind of sociological version of
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle
would start to operate. My presence
would distort what I want to see. In any
case, there is no way I can go to the
diner in 1969, the year in which the
play is set. So Wilson's play, and Friel's,
fulfill an important social function of
theater: they let you hear and see what
you never could in any other way.
Wilson opens our eyes and ears
to the lives of a group of regulars at a
corner diner that belongs to a
hardheaded businessman named
Memphis. Memphis fights the city
leaders who want to condemn the
building housing his business. They
want to tum it over to developers who
have a government-funded urban
renewal con tract. Memphis doesn't
mind selling out, but he wants a fair
price.
Then there is Sterling, the
character that occasions Larry
Fishburne's Tony-Award-winning
performance. He has returned to his
old neighborhood after doing time for
armed robbery. He hangs out at the
diner between spells of half-hearted
job-hunting. Boldly and singlemindedly he forces his attentions on
the Rissa (short for Clarissa), who is
Memphis' only cook and waitress.
But Rissa has set clear boundaries
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for the men she serves everyday. First,
she carries out every request for
service at a glacial pace. Second, she
has severely and obviously scarred her
legs with a razor in order to make
herself less attractive to men.
In his customary corner booth
sits Holloway, the neighborhood's
philosopher. His stories of survival in
the white man's world complement
and often clash with the message of
Malcolm X who is scheduled to
conduct a rally near the restaurant.
But Malcolm is also an outsider to
Wilson's people, a voice which they
haven't yet recognized as authentic,
or, if authentic, then still disconnected
from their own predicaments.
Holloway also tries to stay
somewhat above the fray . When
Sterling or Memphis come to him for
advice on their particular troubles, he
refers them to Aunt Esther, the local
"advisor" who, Holloway says, is three
hundred and twenty nine years old.
Aunt Esther will advise them, drawing
on the wisdom of her African tribal
roots. And when they ask about her
fee, she tells them to throw a twentydollar bill in the Monongahela River.
"Don't worry," she says, "it will get back
to me."
Finally there is Wolf, a chainsmoking bookie only one jump ahead
of his creditors; West, the local
undertaker, who tries to lever the
restaurant away from Memphis; and,
Hambone, a retarded laborer who
spends every day hassling a local white
grocer for a ham the grocer owes him
for some painting Hambone did nine
years ago. "I want my ham! He must
give me my ham!" These are the only
sentences Hambone can speak during
most of the play, though he speaks
them with soul-stirring effect.
Wilson shows us a community of
friends, six men and one woman,
struggling to survive. At a time when
the Civil Rights Movement should be
ushering in a new world order for
black people, the world outside the
diner is dangerous and, with the
exception of Aunt Esther, offers little
hope or healing. Each person is
wounded or damaged in some way.
Each is limited in what he or she can
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do for another person. But they listen
to each other and they do what they
can . They don't live by bread alone
but by the words that proceed from
their mouths. By the end of the play,
out of their pain and feeling for each
other, each gains a somewhat firmer
foothold in the world. Their values
line up.
It' s a long leap from Pittsburgh
in 1969 to Ballybeg, County Donegal
in 1936. Not much connection, you
think, between people, customs, and
circumstances in those two places. But
like August Wilson, Brian Friel has a
gift for drawing us into the lives of his
characters. And like the denizens of
Memphis's diner, the five sisters who
inhabit a thatched-roof cottage in
darkest Ireland face a changing,
dangerous world.
Their names are Kate, Maggie,
Aggie, Rose, and Christine. Their story
is remembered for us by Maggie's son,
Michael. He recalls the summer of
1936 for three reasons. His uncle Jack,
a priest, re turned home from twentyfive years of mission work in an African
leper colony. His aunts bought a
wireless set. And with the set providing
the music, the four younger sisters one
morning overrulled Kate, the oldest,
kicked off their shoes, and danced,
right there in the kitchen.
They all wanted to dance and they
all remembered with joy their school
days when they joined the rest of
Ballybeg for the dancing during the
Feast of Lughnasa. Now, in 1936, they
are mature women. So much depends
upon their respectability that the feast
of the old Celtic god, Lugh, seems
irrelevant to their problems.
Kate is the family's sole support.
She teaches school. Maggie stays home
to take care of young Michael, who is
ille gitimate. Aggie and Christine knit
woolen gloves, but they are about to
lose th e ir income because a new
mechanized glove factory has been
built in Ballybeg. Rose is a bit "simple"
and drives Kate frantic by slipping
away for walks with a boyfriend at any
opportunity.
The hopes of the family ride on
Jack . As the sisters of a priest, their
prestige in the community is assured.

But Jack has exchanged one set of
"traditional values" for another. In
fact, he has been sent home from
Africa because he has "gone native."
Kate asks him when he plans to
celebrate his homecoming Mass. His
answer dashes all her hopes for a
genteel future. He will never again be
allowed to celebrate Mass. He
confesses his dissatisfaction with
Ireland, a society that has drawn stark
lines between religious and secular
life. If he could, he would return to
the leper colony and the African tribe
it serves. Under the tutelage of
Okawah, "my mentor, my counselor,
and, yes, as you would say, my servant"
he has been accepted by people who
see no boundary between the spiritual
and the secular.
Unlike Wilson's people, Friel's
lose their footholds in the world.
Within a few years, Michael tells us in
an epilog, the changes in their world
drive the sisters apart. Two of them
die homeless in London. Their
"traditional values" fail to save them.
These two plays, born m
imaginations nurtured in very
different circumstances, speak
eloquently of the suffering caused by
clashes of values. I find it remarkable
that the Irish playwright, even more
emphatically than the AfricanAmerican playwright, turns our eyes
toward Africa as a source of healing
and hope. There is much in modern
Africa that I am not prepared to
accept. Nevertheless, we in the
prosperous Northern Hemisphere now
grope our way toward a new "world"
order. We struggle to preserve
"traditional values" by tribalizing
ourselves and demonizing others.
Perhaps we should try harder to
remember, as do Holloway and Uncle
Jack, that we live by leaps of faith, and
that, struggle as we might to avoid
them, in the end we must leap over
walls that we ourselves build, toward
demons that we ourselves make up. 0
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POLITICS AND
HOLLYWOOD
Edward Byrne

Our movies,
television, music, books, and journalism
reflect American values, the American way
of life if you wilL It is that content, whether
reflected favorably or unfavorably, that
brings people to the box office. That content
is more powerful than politics or economics.
It drives politics and economics.
Ben Wattenberg,
The First Universal Nation
Movies and
television have propagated images and
themes that support militarism,
imperialism,
racism,
sexism,
authoritarianism, and other undemocratic
values.
Michael Parenti,
Make Believe Media: The Politics
of Entertainment

Edward Byrne teaches in the Department
of English at VU. He has written on film
in The Cresset for several years, and his
article on feminism and film, in last
March's issue, generated a 30 page
exchange of letters with energetic critics. He
is a widely published poet.
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A recent article summarizing
1992's collection of summer movie
releases appeared in The New York
Times. The article, entitled "Summer
Movies Sniff the Political Winds,"
claims--according to its author, Times
film critic Janet Maslin-that all those
escapist films filling the silver screens
throughout the warm and prosperous
months of June, July, and August were
secretly promoting a hidden political
agenda. Curiously enough, Maslin
concludes that, despite Hollywood's
normally overwhelming liberal bias,
the picture pre sen ted to American
audiences this season by the movie
studios somehow seems to emphasize
traditional beliefs, conservative values,
and a desire for social conformity. As
Maslin states: "It's not every season
that so thoroughly enforces the
relatively conservative ideas of
mainstream Americana, family values,
and law-and-order." The films cited by
Maslin include some of the summer's
crop of top attractions: Lethal Weapon
3, Patriot Games, Unlawful Entry, Sister
Act, Housesitter, Class Act, My Cousin
Vinny, and even Encino Man. One
could easily add a number of others to
her list, including Batman Returns, Far
and Away, Unforgiven, and Honey, I Blew
Up the Kid.
The obvious tone of Maslin's
article indicates surprise at the
insistent presence of traditional
mainstream values in current
Hollywood films, and it displays a
touch
of
indignation
that
contemporary filmmakers, as well as
"large numbers of Americans, are now

endorsing those attitudes." Maslin
appears especially upset by the darker
dramas which "steer viewers toward a
law-and-order response to crime" (at
times referring to the violent images
on the screen as "L.A.P.D.-style") and
by the lighter movies that "embrace
conventionality as warmly as these
comedies do." Nevertheless, Maslin
finally acknowledges that these
summer movies so popular at the box
office "may be reflecting authentic
shifts in American attitudes. As such
they have as legitimate a role in the
political process as any other form of
reportage."
Despite Maslin's apparent
surprise, the most astonishing element
of her article lies not in her discovery
of "the relatively conservative ideas of
mainstream Americana" in these
summer films, but rather in an
experienced and respected film critic's
seeming lack of awareness concerning
the schizophrenic nature evident in all
forms of contemporary popular
entertainment-film, television, or
music. Although individual artists
almost uniformly committed to liberal
responses to social issues populate the
entertainment industries, those studio
and record executives directly
responsible for watching box-office
receipts and profit margins are
regularly reminded
by their
accountants that the majority of
Americans do not share the same
liberal political beliefs, but, in fact, are
much more conservative.
No doubt exists about the
almost unanimous adherence to
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liberal or far-left politics by most of
today's prominent film, television, or
recording artists and of their active
involvement in putting forth work
sympathetic to their pet causes or their
preferred candidates. Indeed, an
excellent chronicle of the political
influence exerted by con tern porary
actors, directors, and producers of
film, television, or music is presented
in the recent critically-acclaimed text,
The Power and the Glitter: the HollywoodWashington Connection, by Ronald
Brownstein. Except for the presence
of a few conservative supporters-such
as Tom Selleck, Charlton Heston, and
Arnold Schwarzenegger, all the more
conspicuous by their lack of
numbers-and, of course, the election
of a
former-film-actor-turn e dconservative-politician as President of
the United States during the '80s, the
entertainment industry has been
dominated in recent decades by
figures who, in addition to vigorously
supporting liberal candidates through
personal contributions or public
appearances, continually attempt to
further liberal ideology in the content
of their works.
As Brownstein illustrates and
recent
Presidential
campaign
contribution reports verifY, Hollywood
has become one of the main engines
running the national machine of
liberal politics. Moreover, that
machine is energized by the most
powerful people in the entertainment
industries, including political action
groups like the Hollywood Women's
Political Committee, consisting of
numerous actresses and entertainment
executives, and Norman Lear's People
for the American Way. As well , the
roster of renowned individuals actively
engaged in liberal causes includes
Warren Beatty, Robert Redford,
Barbra Streisand, Jane Fonda, Arsenio
Hall, Don Henley, Sydney Pollack,
Sally Field, Goldie Hawn, Spike Lee,
Oliver Stone, Whoopi Goldberg, Cybill
Shepherd, Richard Dreyfuss, Kim
Bassinger, Ed Asner, Mike Farrell, and
a cast of thousands. Still, a definite
degree of frustration exists on the part
of many of these celebrities as
evidence-most notably, the results of
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recent Gallup polls exammmg
Americans' values and religious
beliefs-indicates that the vast
American audience does not agree
with the political perspectives held by
Hollywood's elite.
Therefore, an ideological tugof-war that has been contested
throughout the various arts since the
social upheaval at the end of the 1960s
is also being reflected in American
films. The culture wars have heated
up and have become more evident in
many celebrated events of recent
years, including the Congressional
battles over funding for the National
Endowment for the Arts and Public
Broadcasting Stations, the conflict over
lyrics in rap or rock music, and the
representation of various ethnic,
religious, or sexual groups in mass
media, just to name a few. In his book,
The De- Valuing of America, William
Bennett adeptly explains the ongoing
culture wars: "The battle for the
culture refers to the struggle over the
principles, sentiments, ideas, and
political attitudes that define the
permissible, the acceptable and the
unacceptable, the preferred and the
disdained, in speech, expression,
attitude, conduct, and politics. This
battle is about music, art, poetry,
literature, television programming,
and movies."
America's entertainment
industries have been caught in the
crossfire of the culture wars. In
response, beleaguered film studio
executives have quietly and subtly
reached a compromise to satisfY their
premier artists' desire to make movies
directly expressing their liberal
political points of view, while at the
same time releasing numerous films
which indirectly appeal to the more
conservative social values of the
nation.
This
schizophrenic
compromise consists of a tacit policy in
which the release of films containing
covert or overt political messages is
determined, with a few unavoidable
exceptions, according to seasons.
Movies likely to appeal to a widespread
audience holding traditional values
and more conservative political views
on issues-the importance of family or

law-and-order, for example-are
typically released during the summer
season. Films that appear to be more
controversial or openly political are
more likely to be kept for a fall release.
Since the majority of films that fit into
the former category are actionadventures or comedies accepted as
appropriate for vacation audiences,
and most of the films suited for the
latter classification are serious dramas
deemed proper for Academy Award
consideration, this policy of coinciding
ideological content with release dates
conveniently matches closely with the
usual past patterns of commercial
release: summer is still the season for
blockbusters like Lethal Weapon 3 or
Patriot Games, fall continues as the
season for Oscar candidates such as
last year's JFK or the upcoming
Malcolm X.
However,
additional
difficulties concerning political
content of works or the ideological
agenda of artists persist for besieged
executives of the entertainment
industries, especially during this
Presidential campaign year. Problems
exist particularly in the television and
recording industries, where works are
created in a shorter span of time and
can more readily respond to topical
issues and current political situations.
For instance, to the dismay of some
executives, as well as a number of
outspoken critics and peers, two talk
show hosts publicly endorsed
candidates on their programs this
summer-Dennis Miller for Ross Perot
(both now cancelled), and Arsenio
Hall for Bill Clinton-as they also
carefully tailored the comedic content
of their programs to persuade voters
towards their men. In addition, ten
television series, from L.A. Law to
Doogie Howser, have already announced
intentions to address the Los Angeles
riots in scripts this season.
In anticipation of difficulties
with viewers, the television networks
have begun to grapple with a number
of shows scheduled for the new fall
season whose producers wish to
engage the election process in some
way. The creators of more than a half
dozen programs have actively
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supported the candidacy of Bill
Clinton and have expressed hopes of
using their programs to influence the
electorate. The programs network
executives are watching most carefully
in order to restrain unseemly
propaganda are Murphy Brown,
Designing Women, Evening Shade, and
Hearts Afire. Murphy Brown's writers
have indicated they will continue their
nearly episodic attacks on Dan Quayle.
The producers of the other three
shows also worked as Clinton media
advisors throughout the summer,
directed the production of the
Democratic National Convention, and
created Bill Clinton's official
documentary film. In addition,
Norman
Lear's
network
has
rescheduled his sitcom to appear only
after the November election to prevent
him from employing the program as a
propaganda platform. In this election
year, the networks are aiming at
achieving an appearance of neutrality.
Similarly, Time-Warner, the parent
corporation
behind
Ice
T's
con troversial rap record, "Cop Killer,"
and one of the largest economic
backe rs at the Democratic National
Convention, is now seeking to shake its
stature as biased in favor of liberal
causes, a perception which has been
d amaging to its image, as well as its
business.
The squeamishness exhibited
by movie studios who are afraid to
offend political sensibilities on either
end of the spectrum arises from a long
history of avoiding American political
campaigns as a subject matter for
films. Considering the inherent
ingredients for superb drama offered
by the political process, one would
expect an extensive list of classic film
treatments on the topic. Instead, not
much more than a handful of films
mi g ht possibly be spotlighted as
exe mplary studies of this subject: Mr.
Smith Goes to Washington (1939), State of
the Union ( 1948), All the King's Men
(1949), The Last Hurrah (1958), The
Best Man (1964), and The Candidate
( 19 72 ). N otably, only one of these
film s, The Best Man, represents a
se rious
drama
concerning a
Presidential campaign. [Note for film
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buffs: a Presidential campaign is only a
secondary part of the plot in Citizen
Kane (1941 ), although informative in
light of recent troubles for Presidential
candidates.]
Nevertheless, The Candidate is
probably the most insightful and most
apropos film for political campaigning
in our time. Starring Robert Redford
as an inexperienced liberal Democrat
slickly groomed for a run at a U.S.
Senate seat held by a popular
Republican incumbent, this film
reveals the superficial level many
recent political campaigns have
achieved, especially since the
dominant influence of television on
the electoral process. The viewing of
The Candidate by some political
consultants not as an exposure of
deception, the way it was intended by
director Michael Ritchie, but as a
prescription for preparation of
candidates, certainly indicates the
present state of American politics.
Fortunately, despite a twentyyear lapse since The Candidate, during
which no major filmmaker, to the
relief of the studios, has confronted
head-on the issue of political
campaigns, two directors now intend
to do so-although only in the form of
comic satires. This fall, first-time
director Tim Robbins will release Bob
Roberts, a film also written by and
starring Robbins. Bob Roberts, another
movie about a Senate campaign, serves
as a comic complement to The
Candidate. In addition, Ivan Reitman
(best known for Ghostbusters, Meatballs,
and Stripes) is now directing Dave,
which Reitman describes as a film
about "a nice ordinary guy who winds
up becoming President of the United
States for a while." This project, which
will be released sometime next year,
promises to be a kind of contemporary
and satiric version of a Frank Capra
movie, starring Kevin Kline as Dave
and Sigourney Weaver as the First
Lady. Still, no serious story on the
subject of political campaigning
appears to be forthcoming in the near
future.
Ironically, one possible reason
for the absence of films directly
observing the political process may be

found in the increased presence of
film stars participating in the process,
as demonstrated in Brownstein's book.
When Warren Beatty, whose best film
remams
the
ambitious
and
controversial Reds, served as one of
Gary Hart's primary advisors during
the 1988 Democratic primaries
(perhaps, partially explaining Hart's
eventual troubles), the need to
produce a fictional Presidential
campaign on screen was nullified.
When Robert Redford actively
campaigns for causes, the responses
received are more immediate than a
film treatment might create, especially
if its message is misapplied, as in the
case of The Candidate. When Meryl
Streep or Cybill Shepherd testify as
activists before a Congressional
committee, they are playing roles no
film script could equal. In effect, real
life has surpassed reel life.
Yet, as Janet Maslin's article
displays, debate continues over the
political messages ingrained in the
body of works Hollywood is now
producing, and how American society
and popular culture is perceived not
only by American audiences, but also
internationally by the new global
society. A few academic critics who
label themselves political progressives,
such as Michael Parenti, author of
Make Believe Media: the Politics of
Entertainment, argue that American
film, which "virtually monopolizes
international cinema distribution,"
and American television programs,
which "are watched in just about every
country in the world," are detrimental
and vigorously promote the worst
aspects of a capitalist society: racism,
sexism, militarism, commercialism,
materialism, etc.
In
contrast,
social
commentator Ben Wattenberg
declares in his book, The First Universal
Nation: "American popular culture is
glitz and sex and violence and
vapididity and materialism and
raucous music. This is true, but
incomplete .
American popular
culture is also musical comedy, NBA
basketball, jeans, Katharine Hepburn,
Bill Cosby, Dixieland, progressive jazz,
CNN, James Michener, Paul Newman,
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Archie Bunker, Beverly Sills, the
International Herald Tribune, Steven
Spielberg, Michael Jordan, Kermit the
Frog, John Updike, Simon and
Garfunkel, Jack Nicholson, Berlitz
schools and Berlin songs." In short,
American entertainment encompasses
"American values, the American way of
life if you will ... , changing the world
in every way you can think of."
In Francis Fukuyama's The End
of History, one of the most talked about
works of political philosophy in recent
years, the author details "the triumph
of the West, of the Western idea"
throughout the world in the last
decade. Fukuyama determines that
"this phenomenon extends beyond
high politics and it can be seen also in
the ineluctable spread of consumerist
Western culture in such diverse
contexts as the peasant's markets and

color television sets now omnipresent
throughout China, the cooperative
restaurants and clothing stores opened
in the past year in Moscow, the
Beethoven piped into Japanese
department stores, and the rock music
enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and
Tehran."
Clearly, critics from both sides
of the political argument, though
disagreeing on the exact impact, can
at least agree on the extensive
cumulative influence of American
culture-especially as represented in
film and television-on the future of
national, as well as international,
political and social events. Therefore,
the high stakes in the current culture
wars that have caught Hollywood in
their crossfire become even more
apparent. As liberal critics applaud
black filmmakers for presenting in

their films defiant, anti-establishment
characters depicting the drugdamaged and poverty-stricken lives of
urban youths amidst apparently
hopeless conditions, or when
conservative critics laud the VicePresident for expressing dismay over
the
glossy
and
unrealistic
glamorization of single motherhood in
a popular sitcom, each group is simply
voicing approval for another volley
being hurled from their side.
In the meantime, many battleweary film and television executives
are doing their best to present
schedules of works that would be
everything to everyone. Others are
simply
running
from
the
confrontation, protecting their
heads--as well as other parts of their
anatomy-and scurrying for cover. 0

Coming next month in The Cresset ...
0

More from the Cresset Colloquium on Martha Nussbaum and Elizabeth Minnich

0

Leonard Klein on Christ the King and Electoral Politics

0

The paintings ofjoel Sheesley: Gardens of Eden in American Suburbia?

Give The Cresset as a gift or extend your own subscription

0 $8.50 per year
0 $14.75 two years

Name________________________________________________________
Address.___________________________________________________

Mail to: The Cresset, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso IN 46383

September 1992

25

./:

..

.•

(' ( /,.,<
' I
'.- _.-_:~,- _,··

--L'

-~----- /

·..

.\

. ,...

·/

. . .:· :.··:Il

..---·
SPARKS

Deconstructive
Dining
Barbara Bazyn
In recent years the provocative
and seminal
(or, to avoid the
language of male domination,
oviparous) the ory of deconstruction
has enabled us to abandon naive
approaches to literature. Thus, with
the aid of recent critics, we have been
able to see the countertexual impulses
towards separation and divorce which
undermine and unravel Jane Austen's
novels ostensibly culminating in
marriage. Nor are we any longer
deceived by the seeming plainspokenness of Wordsworth, who, our
deconstructionists have proven, is the
murkiest and most elitist of poets.
(Indeed, when properly approached
by the strong forces of postmodern
criticism, there is nothing to say about
Wordsworth
that
is
crudely
comprehensible.) But deconstruction
is too suggestive, too rich to be
confined to the difficulties of literary
texts. Its implications fire so wideranging that it is rapidly penetrating
other fields of human endeavor. And
this astonishing approach is perhaps
Barbara Bazyn lives and works in
Chelsea, Iowa. Her poems have appeared
in The Cresset, as well as The Critic,
The Literary Review, and other small
magazines. She has also published in the
op-ed pages of the Des Moines Register.
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especially suited to enrich another
difficult and symbol-laden aspect of
our lives. I refer, of course, to cooking.
After studying under Jean
Jacques DeNourriture, the chef at the
Yale Faculty Club, I venture to propose
a new method of preparing pasta. (I
acknowledge my incalculable debt to
the ground-breaking work of De
Nourriture himself; to my husband,
who lost forty pounds while I
experimented with new methods of
cooking, and to our cat, who, not
having forty pounds to lose,
unfortunately elected to leave home
during my preliminary research. It
goes without saying that without my
parents, my granparents, my greatgrandparents, various apes and the
protozoa of the Pre-Cambrian era, this
work could never have been written.)
But let us start with the recipe
itself:
Rotelle Deconstrutta

1 pound rotelle
4 cups boiling water
5 plum tomatoes
1 teaspoon extra virgin olive oil
1 teaspoon oregano
1 clove garlic, unpeeled
1 onion, minced and deconstructed
Boil four cups of water, but do
not put in the rotelle. Instead, eat the
rotelle, one by one, uncooked. Then
drink the water. Drinking boiling
water tends to unravel and expose the
experience of taste by burning the
tongue. Then eat one half teaspoon
salt. Then eat the ingredients of the
sauce. First, eat one teaspoon of olive
oil mixed with one teaspoon of
oregano. Then all the other
ingredients, one by one, in turn: the
five tomatoes, the clove of garlic, etc.
When you have finished approximately
one half of the ingredients, allow your
fellow diner to consume the rest.
By this method of ingestion, the
diner is able to study the tendency of
each ingredient to uncover its own
identity by seeking the dissolution of
the whole. He discovers the
countertextures of noodles; where a

traditional diner would speak of the
softness and wetness of noodles, of
their limp, slippery quality, the
deconstructionist finds the aporiatic
brittleness and dryness of rotelle.
Noodles when not well done are truly
undone.
Similarly, the deconstructionist
isolates the differing strands and
themes of the sauce. If the traditional
nouvelle cuisine is a heating and a
blending, Ia cuisine deconstructive is
cool, individualistic, difficile. Instead
of a smooth mild sauce, the sharpness
of raw onion.
We come to see that if the
purpose of traditional eating was to
preserve the body, deconstructionist
eating starves the body, but nourishes
the intellect. The normal satisfaction
of hunger is deferred (or differed.)
The deconstructionist concentrates on
the rim of his plate, on the margins of
the eating experience. If asked what
he had for dinner, he answers, "salt,"
or "boiled water." And he recognizes
the tendency of all food to poison and
to starve us. (If asked what he drank,
he says "an ice cube." For he
concentrates on the ice that dilutes his
gin . For if gin is text, the ice cube is
the slippery countertext, which fights
to keep him sober when he is trying to
become otherwise.)
I propose that by this method
traditional elitist standards of taste are
abandoned. And are shown for the
fictions they are. For the aim of
deconstruction is ever to show the true
difficulty underying all that seems
obvious or taken for granted.
Various naive persons have
pointed out to me that they ate with
less pleasure what had been cooked by
this methode. I can only remind them
that the gratification of our taste is a
bourgeois pleasure of the most antiintellectual variety, and here again we
see the ground-breaking role of
deconstruction. For to deconstruct a
poem is not to understand it better or
to enjoy it more, but is on the contrary
to discover the essential metaphysical
groundlessness of poetry, which must
always defer (or differ) to literary
criticism henceforward. And so, of
course, with cooking as well. 0
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Ronald F. Theimann. Constructing a
Public Theology: The Church in a
Pluralistic Culture. Westminster / john
Knox, 1991. pp. 173. $14.95.
Whenever a faculty member
takes
on
administrative
responsibilities, there is talk. Some see
it as a defection to the ranks of the
adversary. Others lament the loss of a
good scholar and the wasting of
intellect. In the case of Ronald
Thiemann, Dean of Harvard Divinity
School since 1986, any such
forebodings were mistaken. The essays
collected in this volume are evidence
that Thiemann's scholarship and
theological acumen have not
atrophied.
In fact, they have
strengthened and extended their
range.
His previous book Revelation and
Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise
(Notre Dame, 1985) sought to restore
the doctrine of revelation to its
rightful place at the center of
theological inquiry. Thiemann argued
that the doctrine of revelation is
indispensable if Christian convictions
about
the
prevenience
or
gratuitousness of God's grace are to be
manifestly intelligible and true. His
September 1992

reading of biblical narrative,
particularly the Gospel of Matthew,
disclosed the identities of both the
divine promisor and his human
promises.
At work here was a
conception of theology "as primarily a
descriptive activity, a second order
mode of reflection which displays the
logic inherent in Christian belief and
practice" (72).
Its normative
judgments are to be justified by holist
persuasion rather than foundational
explanatory theories.
In his new book, Thiemann
applies
this
nonfoundational,
descriptive theological method to
problems ranging from biblical
hermeneutics and worship to global
justice and the revitalization of
theological education. These essays
are occasional pieces reflecting, one
suspects, not only the author's
intellectual interests, but also the
welter of responsibilities and
opportunities besetting the Harvard
Divinity Dean. One of the chapters is
based on his keynote address to the
1990 Lutheran World Federation
Assembly in Curitiba, Brazil. Another
will be familiar to some readers of The
Cresset who may remember it as the
O.P. Kretzmann Lecture at Valparaiso.
Not to be missed is a wonderfully
provocative reassessment of Karl Barth
in which Thiemann identifies a formal
similarity between the German
Lutheran critics of Barmen and Barth's
con temporary American detractors
who share Schliermacher's vision of
"an eternal covenant" linking Christian
faith to the science, culture, politics,
and philosophy of the present day.
Thiemann makes a convincing case
that mirabile dictu it is Barthian
theology that offers greater resources
for dialogue.
A
perennial cnticism of
postliberal theology of the so-called
Yale School (a designation with which
Thiemann is uncomfortable) is that it
speaks a ghetto language possibly
adequate for the sanctuary and parish
hall but unintelligible in the university
and other places where the wider

society conducts its business.
Thiemann strives "to show that a
theology shaped by the biblical
narrative and grounded in the
practices of the Christian community
can ... enable people of faith to regain a
public voice in our pluralistic culture"
(19).
This project requires him to
differentiate his position from those of
the two most prominent postliberals,
George Lindbeck and Stanley
Hauerwas. Thiemann worries that
Lindbeck's "pessimistic reading of our
postmodern culture will engender
such skepticism about the possibility of
Christian involvement in public life as
to render a public theology virtually
impossible" (24).
Even more
troubling is Hauerwas' "continued
attack on liberalism as the 'politics that
know not God,"' which Thiemann
suspects has blinded Hauerwas "to the
resources that liberalism might
provide for the reconstruction of a
political ethos that honors the
pluralism of contemporary public life"
(24). Thiemann's misgivings are not
simply a matter of political prudence.
They are grounded in a recognition of
"God's creative hand in the public
realm" (119) and "a sense of hope
about God's reconciling action in
behalf of the entire cosmos" ( 25). In
any case, "if persons formed in those
communities in which the virtues of
faith, hope and love are nurtured fail
to manifest those virtues in public life,
then the polis will indeed be left to
those with a shrunken and dessicated
view of the possibilities of political
community" ( 25).
What can the Christian Church
contribute td the recovery of a lively
sense of citizenship, the pursuit of the
common good, and the moral renewal
of liberal democracy? Thiemann
offers several recommendations. First,
Christians should debunk the myth
that ours is a "Christian nation" and
recognize themselves as one voice
among many others. The same could
be said about a second and equally
pernicious myth that religion has no
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proper role in American public life.
The establishment and free exercise
clauses of the First Amendment to the
Constitution need not "imply that
questions of conviction, value, and
faith are to be forbidden from public
discourse" (40).
Where the
Constitution requires a line of
separation, we have accepted
uncritically the image of a high wall
without windows or doors. To climb
over this wall so much baggage must
be jettisoned that one arrives on the
other side ill-equipped for the tasks at
hand.
Of course, many Christians have
so accommodated themselves to the
reigning culture as to show very little
that is distinctive about their identities
and commitments in the first place.
Thiemann believes that if Christians
are to have anything interesting or
helpful to offer their non-Christian
neighbors, they will have to recover a
sense of rootedness in tradition. The
recent pastoral letters of the American
Catholic bishops on nuclear weapons
and economic justice demonstrate that
it is possible to speak out of a
tradition, to introduce theological
ideas into the public debate and be
heard.
Thiemann recognizes that
pastoral letters and social statements
are not the only or necessarily the
most significant ways in which
religious communities can contribute
to the commonweal. "Prophetic "
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pronouncements unburdened by
genuine expertise are easily made and
easily dismissed. He calls for the
development of new models for
education and dialogue engaging the
talents of lay men and women.
Thiemann observes, "Our society
desperately needs people who will
bring a commitment to justice into the
public sphere, people who have both
the intelligence and the patience to
bring
together
a
VISIOn
of
righteousness with the careful analysis
of public policy" (41-42). The
churches are in a good position to
cultivate and sponsor such efforts.
Constructing a Public Theology
offers an acute analysis of the current
scene and a challenging agenda.
Thiemann's is a thoughtful, judicious
and altogether conversable voice
which deserves a wide hearing. Amid
the centrifugal forces at work in
theological education today, it is
reassuring to see a politically liberal yet
theologically orthodox Christian keep
his balance, especially when he stands
in the eye of the storm.
Paul Nelson

Earthkeeping in the 90's: Stewardship of
Creation . Edited by Peter De Vos,
Calvin De Witt, Eugene Dykema,
Vernon Ehlers, and Loren Wilkinson.
Eerdmans, 1992.
Lynn White,Jr., Ian McHarg, and
others frequently claim
that
responsibility for our environmental
problems can be traced to the
attitudes
of
anthropocentric
Christianity, the dominant religion of
Western civilization . They ask how can
a religion with a theology that places
salvation of the soul above the
salvation of non-human creation not
lead to ecological ruin? Earthkeeping
argues otherwise. There is ample
scri ptu raJ basis for stewardship of
Creation. It is not necessary to adopt a
sub-Christian or anti-Christian stance
for the sake of the environment.
Christianity can't be the only culprit,
since non-Christian cultures, such as
China and India, also have degraded

their environment. Earthkeeping
frequently rebuffs criticisms of
Christianity as inherently responsible
for environmental degradation. Even
so, in an important, but well-hidden
phrase that could be called the book's
mission statement, "... there is little to
indicate that the Christian vision has
improved the generally destructive
human attitude toward the rest of
creation." Earthkeeping makes a
convincing case, on a scientific, moral,
but mostly Christian basis, for
improving that vision.
This is an important book that
should be read by anyone interested in
environmental conservation and
spirituality, but would in particular
broaden the view of Christians who
distrust the contemporary zeal for
environmental causes and also by nonChristian
environmentalists,
individuals who are often at the
opposite ends of several spectrums.
Some individuals and organizations
continue to belittle environmental
concern, and find direction from
Scripture. Witness ousted Secretary of
Interior James Watt's scriptural
justification for the liquidation of
national forests and commentary by
"The 700 Club" ridiculing concerns
and evidence for global warming,
ozone depletion and the loss of
biodiversity. Even though these
examples might better reflect
economic or political rather than
religious agendas, such attitudes have
alienated some pro-environmental
non-Christians.
The Church's
perceived general disinterest in
environmental problems confirms the
belief that traditional Christianity is
either too inflexible, unable, or
unwilling to address this modern
problem. For example, the Catholic
Church's stand on birth control has
alienated those who believe runaway
population growth is a major cause of
environmental, and eventually human,
degradation.
Earthkeeping is an expansion of a
1980 edition written by several
members of the Calvin Center for
Christian Scholarship at Calvin
College who are professors of
environ men tal studies, physics,
economics, philosophy, and English.
The Cnssel

The ambitious second edition first
outlines
the
extent of our
environmental crisis, then provides a
history of the philosophy and religion
of our civilization, follows with an
analysis of our current thinking, and
concludes with a summary of scriptural
precedent for stewardship. It argues
we should read from, value and
protect Creation as well as Scripture.
The first four chapters provide
the important concepts usually found
in an environmental science textbook,
but in more readable form. They
establish the reality of the problem
and thus an objective basis for
stewardship. Agricultural land use and
abuse, biological diversity and its loss,
human population growth and its
consequences, costs of energy use, the
effects of taxies, and recyling are
discussed in the context of "what to do
with our gifts and power over nature."
The section concludes with a warning
about the human tendency to develop
technology to God-like heights for the
wrong reasons, as did the builders of
the Tower of Babel.
The next section, "Historical
Roots," summarizes the attitudes
towards nature and creation held by
the Greeks, medieval theologians,
early scientists,
literary and
agricultural thinkers of North
America,
and
the
current
environmental movement. While
Christianity may have demystified
nature by disallowing the worship of
nature, science reduced nature to a
mechanistic clockwork that would
allow much greater human control
and potential for destruction. The
Baconian view "nature, to be
commanded, must be obeyed" hinted
at the power to be released if the
correct knowledge was discovered.
Coverage of the Scientific Revolution
curiously stops early in the 18th
century, well before ecology and
related disciplines started. In this
chapter and the next, little mention is
made of the ecological discoveries of
Victor Shelford, Aldo Leopold,
Sherwood Rowland, and an army of
North Americans and Europeans
dedicated to science for the purpose
of conservation.
The early settlement of North
September 1992

America is dominated and facilitated
by a blending of the Baconian idea
that knowledge of nature allows its
control, and a Puritan belief that
subduing and populating the
wilderness would advance the
Kingdom of God. By the mid 1800's,
with the taming process nearly
complete, the first voices for
conservation, from Thoreau, Muir,
and Theodore Roosevelt, rise up. The
Environmental Movement in North
America begins when writers, artists,
and historians, before most of the
farmers and logger, anticipate the
inevitable loss of the frontier,. It is
perhaps fitting that it took a man with
both scientific training and literary
genius, Aldo Leopold, to propose the
land ethic, in which the concept of
right and wrong was extended to land
and wildlife use, even if privately
owned.
The philosophical heart of
Earthkeeping, and a section with broad
appeal, is entitled "Our Mind Today."
The predominant Western outlook has
included a "frontier mentality", where
the sheer abundance of capital
resources allows them to be,
mistakenly, thought of as a long-term
source of income. The environmental
movement has given us a "spaceship
mentality", where the awareness of
limits to resources leads to restraint,
recycling, and sustainability. Behind
the
frontier
mentality
is
"Utilitarianism," which focuses on the
consequences of action, instead of any
intrinsic value the action might have
for the actor. The moral value of an
action is independent of the act itself,
and is independent of the motive.
Value is determined by wants and
desires. This perspective began with
Epicurus and was strengthened by
Galileo and the scientific revolution,
which successfully described how
nature worked. This mechanistic and
useful "how" information undercut the
relevance of "why" explanations
provided by Aristotelian ideals.
Freedom has allowed individuals to
pursue Utilitarian goals, using
economics
and
technology.
Economics and technology, instead of
being the "demons of our age," have
been thoroughly harnessed, if often

inappropriately, by the Utilitarian
ethic. But freedom from barriers to
individual desire is a far different
freedom than the Christian ideal of
freedom from the impediment of sin.
Earthkeeping develops the case
that our ecological problems stem as
much from love of money and the
economic theories that rationalize it as
anything else. The economic growth
of individuals and households was
limited during the Medieval Christian
period by a lack of technology, a
strong doctrine of sin, and emphasis
on salvation. The Reformation, while
still emphasizing individual salvation,
allowed greater individual wealth.
This is in spite of Luther's admonition:
this great, nasty widespread business of
merchandising .... (allowing) that everyone
may sell his wares as dear as he can ... these,
I say, are the ... sources from which the
stream of abomination, injustice, treachery
and guile flows far and wide ...
Calvin, however, argued money was a
symbol of God's grace, and according
to one writer on Calvin, "money is a
sign of the Kingdom of God."
In the hard-hitting chapter
"Valuing Creation," a strong case is
made against valuing creation in
strictly economic terms.
The
economist's perspective of people as
producers and consumers is attacked
as mechanistic and one-dimensional.
People's motives should not be
restricted to, or even largely governed
by, financial self-interest The concept
of "pricelessness" is essential. Some
things, particularly for Christians,
should be above a price. To sell such
things, at any price, makes us
prostitutes. And this reviewer might
add, even though poverty and injustice
may force people to work at
environmentally destructive jobs, what
does it make those corporations and
consumers who "profit" most from the
destruction?
The final section, "The Earth is
the Lord's", describes the biblical
principles of earth-keeping and the
inability to separate stewardship from
justice issues. In 'Dominion as
Stewardship,' Scripture is shown to
decree stewardship as much as
dominion. Even dominion should not
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be interpreted as validating the
imposition of one's will on nature or
weaker people.
To quote,
"[Dominion] is for benefit of the
dominated, ... dominion for power
alone is wrong." The seminal chapter
"Stewardship" is best summarized with
this quote within a quote:
"Throughout the Scriptures, the
visions of the kingdom of God are
visions of men and women in harmony
with creation - men and women as
stewards. We need to recover this
central biblical concept. As Douglas
John Hall puts it:
It is no wonder that an increasing
number of ecologists and others, many of
whom have no personal relation to the
Christian faith, find in this JudaeoChristian symbol one of the most profound
metaphors of what is best in the Western
world. Our first responsibility as Christian
stewards today may be to become better
stewards of the stewardship idea itself. "
In the same way non-believing
ecologists have borrowed (adopted?)
the Christian metaphor of stewardship,
Christians need to heed the call of
ecologists to learn enough science to
make better decisions about their
earthkeeping. Earthkeeping does a
good job explaining how Christians
can educate their hearts and souls
about the environment, yet we also
need to continue to educate our
minds. For the Christian, following
Scriptural admonition of stewardship
is necessary but not sufficient. The
Bible can not be a handbook of
science and fact. It doesn't tell us
whether the ozone layer is thinning or
if species extinction is rampant, let
alone how to prevent these tragedies.
How are we to distinguish wise and
important stewardship from expensive,
time-intensive, and wasteful but wellmeaning policies without factual
understanding?. How are we to know
if our purchases and behavior are
prostituting the earth and ourselves
without knowledge of the real cost of
products to the environment? We
cannot all become scientists
researching and communicating the
problems (God forbid!), but we do
need to understand enough about a
technology or policy to either adopt,

modify, or reject it. If we duck our
responsibility and defer to selfproclaimed experts to decide for us
what is the truth, too often what we get
instead is dross provided by mediasavvy "boosters" and "spin doctors".
Choose we must, and God help us that
our decisions are timely and informed
both spiritually and scientifically.
Earthkeeping concludes with
'Guideposts,' a list of environmental
perspectives, several of which
resonated with this reviewer:
I
"The exercise of power inherent
in our dominion must be rooted in
[humble] wonder ... "
I
"We have the responsibility to
work toward a just human sharing of
creation"
I
"Stewardship implies
responsibility for both human and
nonhuman creatures"
I
" ... use creation in a sustainable
way"
I
" ... know ...where the things that
sustain us come from, and how they
are produced"
I
"Christians ... should reform those
societal structures which damage the
ecosphere and produce injustice."
I
"We must maintain a clear
distinction between price and value."
I
"We
must
limit
human
population to a [sustainable] ... level."
Our current lifestyle makes these
charges difficult. Once we lived
imbedded in nature where the need
for stewardship was more directly
apparent, and its practice more
immediately important and possible.
Most of us now live so isolated from
nature, proper stewardship is an
abstraction, and not something we can
know from merely recycling, driving
less, and eating low on the food chain.
We need to re-aquaint ourselves with
creation. We need to walk a farm field
to see what is involved so that we may
eat. We need to hike the trails at one
of the remaining natural areas to
rekindle our sense of wonder and
relearn our surroundings.
Throughout Earthkeeping, and in
such new organizations as 'Joint
Appeal by Religion and Science for the
Environment,' there is a healthy effort
to philosophically reunite religion and
science.
This reviewer first

encountered this theme in Ian
Barbour's 1966 Issues in Science and
Religion. Barbour argues science and
religion are more than just
"complementary languages" that have
recently learned humility about
overreaching into the other's realm."
They share "... significant parallels in
their methods ... " with science " ... a
more human enterprise ... " and
theology "... more self-critical..." than
generally realized. Both must allow for
"man's kinship with nature and his
transcendence of nature." In a quote
by A. N. Whitehead from Science and
the Modem World, chosen by Barbour to
conclude his Introduction:
"When we consider what religion is
for mankind and what science is, it is no
exaggeration to say that the future course of
history depends upon the decision of this
generation as to the relations between
them."
Bruce Edinger

Henry F. May. The Divided Heart: Essays
on Protestantism and the Enlightenment in
America. Oxford University Press, 1991.
219 pp.
Collections of essays are like
rummage sales. You never know
whether you'll find gems or junk.
This collection shines. Henry F.
May, a Berkeley historian best known
for his 1976 monograph, The
Enlightenment in America, offers insights
on almost every page to illuminate a
wide range of topics.
Naturally, the gems picked up
from any rummage will depend on the
needs of the reader. The first three
essays here demonstrate some ofMay's
"allegiances" : to the study of religion
as a facet of American intellectual
history; to one of his mentors, Henry
Nash Smith; and to Reinhold Neibuhr.
This confluence between May's
work and the thought of Reinhold
Niebuhr was particularly intriguing to
me. Citing (along with many of his
contemporaries) an influence from
Niebuhr's The Irony of American History,
May summarizes the messge: "Human
beings are finite and limited, but
occasionallly
capable
of
The Cressel
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transcendence. One can be successful
only in accepting the inevitability of
partial failure" (70).
Focused more specifically on the
historian's craft, this theological
insight translates into an historical
approach wich combines "faith and
skepticism" (4). "Words never quite
reflect prior realities," May confesses.
"One can never reach the truth, but
one goes on trying to get a little
closer" (9). May's conclusion is that
"ambivalence [is] the most fruitful
perspective for a historian" (81).
This may not seem profound, but
it does offer insight into the humble
wisdom of the study of history. In a
culture fixated on certainty and the
violent resolution of conflict where
winners and losers must be declared, a
commitment to live in and represent
ambivalence may become a great, even
necessary, cultural habit worth
transmitting from generation to
generation.
Two essays in the collection
feature May on Protestantism, more
specifically on Harriet Beecher Stowe
and Jonathan Edwards. The essay on
Stowe introduces her Oldtown Folks as a
struggle by the author of Uncle Tom's
Cabin to come to terms with her strict
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Calvinist upbringing. Not surprisingly,
the essay also demonstrates May's
ambivalence about his own Calvinist
heritage.
The essay brings to life
nineteenth-century Calvinist clergy
such as Nathaniel Emmons and Lyman
Beecher, who dominated public life in
old New England, and who, May
understands, represent both BeecherStowe's and his own Calvinist father.
Finally, May concludes, Beecher-Stowe
discovered that "the mystery of God's
dealing with men was swallowed up in
the greater mystery of the love of
Christ. To the extent that she really
achieved this conviction, she was surely
a better Christian, and perhaps even a
better Christian theologian, than
Nathaniel Emmons" (97). May seems
fully aware of, and unruffled by, the
Freudian subtext.
On Edwards, -"America's
greatest theologian" and even more
the patriarch-May positively glitters.
He calmly describes seven different
interpretations of Edwards, ranging
from the adulation of his disciples to
the scorn of Mark Twain, and
extending to the role of Edwards "in
the current revival of evangelical
Protestantism" (140). May concludes

with a question designed to explore
the interaction of skepticism and faith:
"Is it possible," he asks, "to have a
fruitful discussion of a great religious
thinker with the frank participation of
believers, rejecters, and agnostics?"
(144)

That question could well be
reframed as the question for American
culture writ large. "Is it possible," one
might ask, _ "to have a fruitful
discussion of a great problem-say,
abortion-with the frank participation
of believers, rejecters, and agnostics?"
May's final word, contained in
three essays on "The Enlightenment
and After," offers cautious hope:
In America all causes tend to become
crusades. Around the corner of the
sublime lurks the crazy .... There is no
poetry without danger, no prophecy
without potential violence. It is fortunate
that America's constitutional system, our
main surviving inheritance from the
Enlightenment, has so far, often
precariously, held its own. (196)

The Divided Heart expresses well,
in short, both the fruitfulness and the
fragility of ambivalence in and about
America.
Jon Pahl
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